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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VoLum VI. JuT, 1931 Nu mua 3.
STATE INCOME TAXATION AS AFFECTED BY
PROPERTY TAX LIMITATIONS
On all sides one hears of the crying need for tax reduction. The
owner of tangible property, particularly real property, constantly
complains that the tax burden imposed is confiscatory While it
has been the political slogan of each campaign that taxes will be
reduced the public is beginning to realize that there is no relief to
be had in this direction. The "public" demands too much of gov-
ernment today to even hope that such can be realized. The answer
to the property owner's plea for taxation relief must be along the
line of a new distribution of tax burdens. This has long been the
remedy suggested by experts on taxation, and has, in the last two
decades, received the approval and recommendation of numerous
tax investigating committees and legislative bodies. The income
tax is repeatedly urged as the best alternative, or supplementary,
method by which this relief may be had. It is the purpose here
to discuss the validity of income taxation for state purposes with
reference to the objections that may be raised to such a system of
taxation under the constitutional limitations upon property taxa-
tion. No attempt will be made to consider problems that arise in
connection with such taxes, such, for instance, as questions per-
taining to progressive features, exemptions, and the like.
Generally, the constitutions of the states can be divided into two
classes. First, those which specifically provide for taxation of in-
comes, and second, those which contain no such provision. In
cases of the first class it will be merely a matter of interpretation
to decide whether or not any particular tax is within the scope of
the constitutional authority Such questions are not here con-
sidered. It is with the validity of income taxation under constitu-
tions of the second type that we are here concerned.
In cases of the second class the provisions relative to the exercise
of the taxing power vary greatly in terminology, but in effect can
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be separated into two groups. First, those which provide that all
taxes on property shall be according to value and uniform and equal
upon all property in the state, and second, those which provide that
the legislature shall have the power to classify property for the pur-
pose of taxation. The discussion here details primarily with the
first of these two classes.
Typical of the constitutional provisions of the type under discus-
sion was that of Washington, prior to the amendment of 1930.
"All property in the state not exempt under the laws of
the United States or under this Constitution shall be taxed
in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by
law "
"The legislature shall provide by law a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation on all property in
the state, according to its value in money, and shall pre-
scribe such regulations by general law as shall secure a
just valuation for taxation of all property, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to
the value of his, her or its property "1
The courts are practically unanimous in holding that a state con-
stitution is a limitation rather than a grant of power. The power
to tax inheres in the sovereign state and is abridged only by consti-
tutional limitations. 2 It is also quite generally conceded that con-
stitutional limitations upon the imposition of property taxes such
as above quoted apply only to taxes on property and not to excise
or license taxes.3 Application of this rule is found in cases sus-
taining the validity of inheritance taxes4 , gasoline sales taxes',
motor vehicle," peddlers7 and other license and excise taxes.
Upon the authority of such cases it would seem that the imposi-
tion of an income tax is within the constitutional powers of the
state legislature, restricted only by the equality and due process
clauses of the constitutions, unless such a tax be construed as some
species of property tax, in which event the tax imposed upon in-
"CONST. OF WASH., Art. VII, Sees. 1, 2.
2 12 C. J. 745, Standard Oil Go. v. Graves, 94 Wash. 291, 162 Pac. 558
(1917).
2State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77 Pae. 961, 102 Am. St. Rep. 914, 1 Ann.
Cas. 634, 67 L. R. A. 280 (1904) State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 71 Pac. 20
(1902).
'State v. Clark, supra, note 2.
6 State v. Hart, 125 Wash. 520, 217 Pac. 45 (1923).
Lillard v. Melton, 103 So. Car. 10, 87 S. E. 421 (1915).
Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502 (1923)
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comes must be according to value and at the same rate as the taxes
imposed upon other property in the state.
What, then, is the nature of an income tax ?
The text-writers generally state that an income tax is not a
property tax within the meaning of such constitutional provisions. 8
Several courts, however, have held or stated that such a tax is a
property tax.
The Pollock cases,9 decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, are probably most often cited in support of the view that an
income tax is a property tax. In these cases the court held that the
first federal income tax was invalid insofar as it included income
from real property within the base upon which the tax was levied.
Statements in the case indicated that this result was reached be-
cause the tax was considered as a property tax. However, tns is
a misconstruction of the language used, because the limitation gov-
erning the imposition of federal taxes is not concerned with prop-
erty taxes, the constitution provides limitations upon "direct"
taxes. A direct tax is not synonymous with property tax, but is
much broader, as is shown by the fact that a capitation tax is as
well included within the meaning of the term. The Pollock cases
held that, within the meaning of the federal constitution, an income
tax is a direct tax insofar as it includes income from real property
In discussing the meaning of these cases as bearing upon this point
the Supreme Court of Illinois has said.
"The decision of that case related to the constitutional
powers of Congress to pass an income tax law, and it was
held that such taxation was direct and not indirect within
the meaning of the Constitution, and the income tax law
was therefore held unconstitutional. But the court, as in-
dicated by the language in its opinion on rehearing
went no farther, as to the tax on the income from real
estate than to hold that it fell within the same class as the
source whence the income was derived, that is, that a tax
upon the realty and a tax upon the receipts therefrom were
alike direct.
The issue arising in the Pollock cases, therefore, was not
whether an income tax was a tax on real estate or an inter-
est therein, but whether such tax based on rentals was a
8BLAcx ON INCOiE AND OTHER FEDEl TAxEs (3rd Ed., 1917) 41, 4
CooLY, TAxATIoN (4th Ed., 1924) Sees. 1739 et seq., 26 M. C. L. 142; 31
C. J. 401.
0 Pofock v. Farmer's Loan & T. Jo., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673,
39 L. Ed. 759, rev'd 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912, 39 L. Ed. 1108 (1894).
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direct tax and therefore within the prohibition of the Con-
stitution."1 0
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, upon several occa-
sions, has expressed the view that an income tax is a property tax
rather than an excise within the meamng of the constitution of
that commonwealth. This doctrine was first announced in an opin-
ion rendered upon questions propounded by the legislative body- as
to the validity of a proposed income tax measure under the consti-
tution as it then stood."' The court followed the Pollock cases and
concluded that such a tax would be a property tax insofar as it
taxed incomes derived from intangible personal property and pro-
fessions, trades and employments.'2 It was there said
"A tax upon income from money on deposit or at inter-
est, from bonds, notes or other debts due, and as dividends
from stocks, coupled with exemption from all other taxa-
tion of the principal from which such income flows, is, in
substance and effect, a tax upon the property from which
it is derived. A tax upon the income of property is in
reality a tax upon the property itself. Property by income
produces its kind, that is, it produces property and some-
thing different. It does not matter what name is em-
ployed. The character of the tax cannot be changed by
calling it an excise and not a property tax. In its essence
a tax upon income derived from property is a tax upon the
property This was decided after most elaborate con-
sideration, with affluent citation of authorities, in Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. We do not need to re-
view that ground or to restate the arguments in its sup-
port. It follows that a tax upon such income is a prop-
erty and not an excise tax."
The same rule was thereafter stated in several cases decided by
this court.'8
In Delaware it has also been said that an income tax is a property
tax." The case was one wherein the state sought to recover an
unpaid income tax. It was contended that the state could not tax
10 Young v. Illinoss Athletic Club, 310 Ill. 75, 141 N. E. 369, 30 A. L. R.
985 (1923).
1, The constitution of Massachusetts was thereafter amended to permit
the imposition of taxes on income. Constit. of Mass. Amend. 44.
1 2 1n re Optmton of Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 108 N. E. 570 (1915).
1Magu're v. Tax Coni'r., 230 Mass. 503, 120 N. E. 162, 165 (1918) Ken-
nedy v. Com'r., 256 Mass. 426, 152 N. E. 747, 748 (1926).
' State v. Pinder, 7 Boyce (Del.) 416, 108 Atl. 43 (1919).
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income because it was not property The constitution contained
no uniformity or ad valorem requirements. The court held the tax
was valid. It was first pointed out that the power to tax is not
restricted by the constitution to property alone, and that the consti-
tion is a grant of power. This, it seems, was all that was necessary
to give validity to the tax levied, but the court proceeded
to say that, in any event, the tax was valid because income, being
the subject of larceny, is property
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the following year, reached
the same conclusion." The constitution of that state provided that
"the legislature shall not have the power to levy in any one year
a greater rate of taxation than 65/100 of 1% on the value of the
taxable property within the state." The questions argued were
(a) Whether income is property within the ordinary legal sense of
the word, and (b) If so, is it embraced within the meaning of
"property" in the above clause of the constitution? Several cases
are cited and reference is made to the holding that salary of an
office is property within the meaning of constitutional provisions.
The decision seems to be based, however, upon the following bit of
syllogistic reasoning-
"To summarize- Money or any other thing of value,
acquired as gain or profit from capital or labor, is prop-
erty, in the aggregate, these acquisitions constitute in-
come, and in accordance with the axiom that the whole
includes all of its parts, income includes property and
nothing but property, and therefore is itself property "
An analysis of this bit of deductive logic reveals that there are
in the major and minor prenise no common factors. In the major
premise that which is declared equivalent to property is a thing
in esse, tangible things after their acquisition. In the minor premise
that which is income is an act-acquiring. The act of acquiring
and the thing acquired are called synonymous. The fallacy of the
reasoning employed is .best illustrated by paraphrasing. First
Apples and pears picked from trees are fruit. Second. The picking
of apples and pears from trees constitutes labor.
Therefore, fruit is labor.
The same views have been expressed by justices dissenting in
some of the cases hereafter mentioned. While their reasoning has
Eliasberg Bros. Mere. Co. V. GrzMes, 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56, 11 A. L. R.
300 (1920).
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not been reduced to syllogistic form, as in the foregoing case, these
justices, also, seem to have failed to have distinguished the differ-
ence between the thing and the acquisition thereof. Illustrative is
the opinion of Fars, J., dissenting in a Missouri case -16
"Income is ordinarily paid in money Money is taxable
property Income is always paid either in money or in
kind, that is, in real and personal property from which it
accrues or by which it is earned. Of course, real and per
sonal property are taxable; so income is always paid in a
commodity which is taxable by the state. Income, particu-
larly, net income, which I am here considering, is the
original and sole source of all existing private property
The very definition of the word forecloses doubt upon the
truth of this fact, It is true that such portion of any
given income as is consumed in living expenses cannot be
added to capital. But it is too plain for argument that
even such part of an income is property, and so remains
till consumed for immediate needs. The fact that such
property is presently consumed does not alter its status as
property The owner of real estate may rent it either
for money, the representative of all property, or for a part
of the crop grown upon the land. In both cases what he
gets as rent is income from the land, and is income under
the act I am now discussing, and that income is property,
whether it is paid in money, or in bushels of wheat or corn,
or in bales of cotton."
A somewhat different argument is pursued by Sykes, J., dis-
senting in an Alabama case,1 7 based, apparently, upon the prm-
ciples of the Pollock eases.
"As it construes the case it means that by virtue of
the ownership of property one has the right of possessing,
enjoying, and using this property in every lawful manner
in which he sees proper, and that as a necessary incident
to the ownership of this property he has the right to rent,
lease or cultivate the property, if it be land, and that all of
these rights are mere incidents of ownership, and that
necessarily a tax on the income received from this prop-
erty is a tax on its user, and therefore a tax on the property
itself, wherever property is providently used some
income is necessarily derived therefrom, and the right to
10 Ludlow-Baylor Wire Co. v. Woflbmnck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W 196, 203,
204 (1918)
" Hattiesburg Grocery Co. V. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4, aff'd.,
126 Miss. 655, 89 So. 369 (1921).
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receive this income is but an incident of the ownership of
that property A tax upon tis right is indirectly a burden
and a tax upon the property itself."
Such reasoning is no doubt applicable to cases where by means
of a tax of a kind which the legislative body has the right to levy
it attempts to reach that which is not taxable by that legislative
body, but the reasoning does not appear to have application to the
state whose power of taxation is inherent and not by grant.
Upon the other hand there is a series of cases, not large in num-
ber, but extending over a considerable period of time, supporting
the view that an income tax is not a property tax. The earliest
of these cases is Savanna v. Hartridge,18 decided by the Supreme
Court of Georgia in 1850. It was there said.
"The subject of taxation has been, very properly,
divided into three classes-capitation, property and in-
come, and this distinction is recognized, not only by all
writers on political economy, but in the general tax laws
of all governments, and when one or more is mentioned
or treated of, the other is never intended."
In 1863 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had occasion to say
that a tax on income is not a tax on capital 9 and, in 1869, the
Supreme Court of Missouri was called upon to decide whether an
income tax was a property tax within the meaning of its consti-
tution. It concluded that it was not.20
In 1870 the question of the validity of a municipal tax of 1%
of the gross receipts of an insurance agency located in Dubuque
was presented to the Supreme Court of Iowa.21 The city charter
empowered it "to provide for the assessment of all taxable property
in said city with reference to taxation for city purposes." It was
held that gross income was not property The court said.
"It certainly cannot be claimed that the gross income
of individuals or corporations from any business in wich
they may engage, for a specified period without regard
to the money or property realized and on hand at the
expiration of the time, can be properly described by the
term property No one will pretend that the sum shown
" 8 Ga. 23.
"Drexel -v. Con., 46 Pa. St. 31.
"Glasgow v. Rouse, 43 Mo. 479.
"Dubuque v. Northwesterm ife Ins., Co., 29 Iowa 9.
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as the footing of the debit side of the merchant's cash
book, during a year's business, can be called property
The money represented by each item of the account when
in his possession was property, but the aggregate of the
whole amount of money passing through his hands for a
year could not, at the end of that time, when he possessed
a small portion of it, be called property "
The statement made by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1878 is
often quoted
"But are gross earnings and interest, coming in from
any source, labor, capital, money loaned-are these
things property in the sense of the Constitution, and to
be taxed as real, genuine property-such as real estate
and personal effects--or are these really income?
"Certainly the gross earnings of a laboring man are
nothing but his income, and so, it would seem, the earnings
of a salaried officer are income, and so the income from
capital employed in a bank, or railroad, or manufactory,
would seem to be income only The net income, after
expenses are paid, becomes property when invested, or if it
be money lying in a bank, or locked up at home. But, to
call it property when it is all consumed as fast as it arises
-going on the back, or m the stomach, or in carriages
and horses (which are taxed), or in travel and frolic-to
call such income, so used, property, would seem a per-
version of terms."
"The fact is property is a tree, income is the fruit,
labor is a tree, income, the frit, capital, the tree, in-
come the fruit. The fruit, if not consumed as fast as it
ripens, will germinate from the seed which it incloses,
and will produce other trees, and grow into more property,
but so long as it is fruit merely, and plucked to eat, and
consumed in the eating, it is no tree, and will produce itself
no fruit.""
This was followed by a decision of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in 190323 holding a state income tax not to be a tax on
property, even though at the same time it held such a tax not
applicable to the salary received by a federal judge.
In 1915 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire handed down
an opimon 24 in which the majority of the court stated that an
" Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93.
"Purnell v. Page, 133 No. Car. 125, 45 S. E. 534.
21 In re O1nnson of Justices, 77 N. H. 611, 93 Ad. 311.
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income tax would be valid under the constitution of that state.
The justices were unaninous in agreeing that an income tax is not
a property tax, however. Peaslee, J., who dissented from the
majority on other grounds, said.
"It ismnportant that, at the outset, the fundamental dif-
ference between income and property be stated, and then as
we go on it will be more plainly seen how and why the
attempt to treat the two things as one must necessarily
fail. A man's property is the amount of wealth he pos-
sesses at a particular moment, while his income is the
amount of wealth obtained during some specified period.
The two are measured by different standards. One is
measured by amount and present possession. The other is
determined by receipts, and quantity and time are neces-
sary elements of the measure employed. In the measure
of property present ownership is an essential element, and
lapse of time can have no place. In the measure of income
lapse of time is an essential element, and present posses-
sion can have no place. Each is measurable, but a common
measure cannot be applied to both. The two are as incom-
mensurate as a line and an angle."
In 1918 the Supreme Court of Missouri had occasion to recon-
sider the problem which it had many years earlier decided in
Glasgow v. Rowse.25 While the majority of the court seems to
acknowledge that income is property, it expresses the belief that
it is not such property as is contemplated by the constitutional
provision, and adheres to the doctrine laid down in the earlier
case. The case, at its best, is not worthy of much weight on either
side of the controversy
Following this, in 1921, came a decision of the Mlississippi court.2
The question was as to the validity of a state income tax. The
constitution provided that property should be taxed in proportion
to its value and assessed for taxes under general laws and by urn-
form rules according to its true value. It was contended that
(a) A tax on income is a tax on specific property, from the value
of which the income taxed must be computed, and (b)A tax on in-
come derived from property is a tax on the property from which
the income was derived. The court said.
"But a tax on income to be paid by the recipient thereof
without -reference to whether he has invested, spent, or
5 Supra, note 20.
Hattiesburg Groc. Co. v. Robertson, supra, note 17.
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wasted it, as is the tax here in question, is not on the
specific property from which the income was received
irrespective of the person of the recipient, neither is a
tax on the person irrespective of property, for no defini-
tion of income can be framed under which it can be dis-
sociated from the activities of the person who produced
or received it, so that a tax on income necessarily includes
among its elements the production or receipt of prop-
erty (cases cited), and to that extent is a tax on the per-
formance of an act resulting in gain to the person per-
forming it, and the rule is, and was when Sec. 112 of
the State Constitution was adopted, that when the tax
is imposed on the performance of an act, it will not be
classified as a tax on property, although it is proportioned
in amounts to the value of the property used in connection
with or produced by the act which is taxed.
" while a tax on income includes some of the elements
both of a tax on property and of a tax on persons, it can-
not be classified as strictly a tax on either, for it is gen-
erically and necessarily an excise, and should be enforced
as such unless and until so to do would accomplish the
result which Sec. 112 of the constitution was adopted to
prevent, which is to prevent discrimination in the taxa-
tion of property, so that all property shall bear its due
proportion of the burdens of government."
In 1925 the Supreme Court of Arkansas said .27
"Now, of the various forms and kinds of excise taxes, a
tax on incomes holds its own place, it falls in its own
particular and distinctive class, and must not be con-
founded with occupation, license, franchise, and business
taxes. While an income tax is a tax laid on the income
from property or occupation, it is nevertheless a special
and direct tax upon the subject designated for purposes
of taxation as income, whereas an occupation tax is an
excise upon those engaged in a particular occupation, and
although the amount of the.tax may be graded in accord-
ance with the income derived from the occupation, never-
theless a tax on the right to pursue the occupation and
carry on the business is a license or occupation tax, and
not an income tax. (Cases cited.) But here again let me
observe that the occupation, business, profession, or em-
ployment is one thing, while the income derived therefrom
is an entirely different thing."
7Sims v. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S. W 720.
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This case was approved by the same court in a case arising four
years later.28
Several courts have had occasion to consider the question of
whether income taxes come within the meaning of a covenant in
a lease to pay taxes on the property leased. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, which, as hereinbefore pointed out, has
several times expressed the view that an income tax is a property
tax, upon such an occasion "9 said.
"Doubtless income when received is property But a
tax on the income of a corporation is not imposed directly
on its property but against the gain or revenue derived
from its property Income is something derived from
property, labor, skill, ingenuity or sound judgment, or
from two or more in combination. It is not commonly
thought of as property but as gain derived from property,
or some other productive source. The natural significance
of the agreement to pay 'taxes on the property' of
the plaintiff is to pay taxes levied on the receipt of rental."
It was then held that a covenant to "pay all public taxes, assess-
ments and charges whatsoever on the property, franchise or cap-
ital stock" of the lessor company did not contemplate the pay-
ment of income taxes by lessee. This, being the later expression
of the court, detracts considerably from the effect generally ac-
corded to the earlier cases upon the nature of an income tax. 0
From the foregoing review of the cases it will be seen that the
numerical majority is in favor of the holding that an income tax
is not a property tax within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
visions considered. Unfortunately, however, there does not seem
to be any well-crystallized theory upon wnch the majority holding
is based.
It is submitted that the confusion which exists has arisen be-
cause many, judges and economists as well as laymen, have pro-
ceeded upon the theory that taxes are levied upon the property
or the income, or the business, or the article sold, consumed or
imported, rather than upon the saidividual who owns the property,
or receives the income, or engages in the business, or sells, consumes
Stanley v. qates, 179 Ark. 886, 19 S. W. (2d) 1000 (1929).
Stony Brook R. Corp. v. Boston & M. R. Go., 260 Mass. 379, 157 N. E.
607, 53 A. L. . 700 (1927).
"To the same effect is Young v. 171inois Athletic Club, supra, note 10.
See also annotations and cases cited at 9 A. L. I. 1566, 30 A. L. R. 991, 45
A. L. R. 756, and 53 A. L. R. 705.
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or imports the article. Fundamentally, taxes are levies exacted by
the sovereign, or the state, from the individuals who are its sub-
jects or who compose it. Taxes are the toll which the sovereign
demands of the subject, the pro rata share contributed by the
citizen to the support of the state. Tis is as true today as it was
in feudal times.
The nomenclature applied to a tax, or its classification as a tax
of one type or another has its foundation in the subject-matter
upon which depends the liability or non-liability of an individual
for the payment of the tax. A tax is called a poll tax when it is
imposed upon an individual because of his mere presence within
the jurisdiction of the sovereign laying the tax. The tax is payable
by the individual, it is measured by a certain rate put upon the
poll. A tax is called a property tax when it is imposed upon
an individual because of his ownership or possession of property,
real or personal, tangible or intangible. The tax is payable by the
individual, it is measured by the value of the property owned or
possessed. A tax is called an excise when it is imposed upon an
individual because of his having performed some particular act,
such as importing wheat, or practicing law, or selling gasoline for
use in automobiles, or engaging in business in corporate form, or
receiving an inheritance. The tax is payable by the individual,
it is measured by the rate imposed upon the doing of the act men-
tioned.
With respect to property taxes, there are courts which have sug-
gested that the subject-matter of the tax is the land and have dis-
regarded entirely the element of the individual. This view has
been induced by the wording of constitutions and statutes indicat-
ing that taxes shall or may be levied upon property and by statu-
tory enactments permitting the enforcement of taxes based upon
ownership of real property, when unpaid by the owner, throughi
seizure and sale of the property When the issue has been squarely
presented to courts to decide the nature of such a tax the true
theory underlying our system of taxation has not been lost sight
of and, consistent therewith, it has been generally held that a prop-
erty tax is a tax levied against the individual and not against the
land or the property
"The individual, and not his property, pays the tax.
The property is resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining
the amount of the tax with which the owner must be
charged, and for the purpose of enforcing payment when
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the owner shall be legally m default in paying at the time
stipulated by law." 3' 1
The Supreme Court of Montana said :82
"But the fact is that all taxes are levied upon persons,
and not upon property It is the person that is taxed or
licensed. In case of taxation, strictly speaking, the prop-
erty wich the person owns is used to determine the amount
of the tax which he shall pay, but it is the person who,
after all, pays the tax, and not the property The person
is liable, and the property, in addition to being the means
of determining what the person shall pay, is also a security
for its payment."
This court cites with approval and quotes from cases from other
jurisdictions to the same effect.3
The Supreme Court of Louisiana 4 reaches the same conclusion
and in support of its position cites cases from several jurisdictions
and quotes DEsTy oN TAxATIoN as follows :8"
"The tax is imposed on the person of the owner; for
though property is resorted to for the purpose of ascertain-
ing the amount.of the tax, yet the individual, and not the
property, pays the tax, "
In the cases quoted from discussing the nature and validity of
income taxation the courts have certainly not stated their recog-
nition of the fact that the tax is imposed-upon the individual rather
than the res. Loose language, if not recognition of the opposing
theory, seems to mark these opinions. More clarity of expression
in this regard is to be found in cases arising under constitutional
provisions specifically providing for income tax levies. Illustra-
tive of this is the statement of the Wisconsin Supreme Court:36
"Much confusion of thought arises from regarding the
income tax as a tax that is levied upon or attaches to prop-
erty as such, irrespective of the person sought to be taxed.
1111 CoorsY, TAxATioN (4th Ed., 1924), 93.
S2tate v. Camp Sing, 18 Mont. 128, 44 Pac. 516, 32 L .R. A. 635, 56 Am.
Stfl Rep. 551 (1896).
R undell v. Lakey, 40 N. Y. 513 (1869) Everson v. Syracuse, 29 Hun.
(N. Y.) 486 (1883) Green v. Craft, 28 Miss 70 (I864).
S1 uccession of Merezer, 42 La. Ann. 1135, 8 So. 732, 11 L. R. A. 817(1890).
1 DEsTY, TAXATION 7.
"'State ex rel. Sallie F Moon Co. v. Tax Commssion, 166 Wis. 287, 163
N. W. 639 (1917).
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It is the recipient of the income that is taxed, not his prop-
erty, and the vital question in each case is, Has the per-
son sought to be taxed received an income during the tax
year? If so, such income, unless specifically exempted, is
subject to a tax though the property out of which it is
paid may have been exempt from an income tax in the
hands of the payor. But the tax does not seek to reach
property, or an interest in property as such. It is a burden
laid upon the recipient of income."
A similar suggestion is contained in the statement of the South
Carolina court :37
"The income tax is primarily a subjective tax imposing
personal liability upon the recipient of the income. It
proceeds fundamentally upon the theory that all residents
and citizens of the state, whether natural persons or do-
mestic corporations, should contribute to the public treas-
ury m proportion to ability to pay, measured by the
amount of net income from all sources."
Or as was again said by the Wisconsin court :38
"The effort to trace the funds or profits passing from
one corporation to another and to claim that, since such
profits have paid one income tax for a certain year, they
should not pay another, is useless, because an income tax
is not levied upon property, funds, or profits, but upon the
right of an individual or corporation to receive income
or profits. The same funds or property may constitute
the income or profits of a dozen or more individuals dur-
ing the same year."
A property tax, properly considered, is but an excise based upon
the ownership or possession of property In this sense it is a tax
measured by the amount of capital assets possessed by the individual
who is taxed. So also, an income tax is but an excise based upon
revenues received. In this sense it is a tax measured by the amount
of income received by an individual during a given period of time.
An income tax, so considered, is not the same as nor included
within the meaning of a property tax unless the measures used
are identical, or so similar as to be, for practical purposes, the
same. Resorting to definition it is found that there is a well-
3, Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Tax Commussson, 129 S. C. 480, 124 S. E. 761
(1924).
2Pamne v. Oshlkosh, 190 Wis. 69, 208 N. W 790 (1926).
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defined and clear-cut distinction between 'capital' and 'income.'
Capital is defined.
"Money, property or stock employed in trade, manu-
factures, etc., the sum mavested or lent, as distingushed
from the income or tnterest." (Italics ours.) 89
Income is defined.
"That gain winch proceeds from labor, business, prop-
erty, or capital of any kind, as the produce of a farm, the
rent of houses, the proceeds of professional business, the
profits of commerce or of an occupation, or the interest of
money or stsock in funds, etc., revenue, receipts, salary,
especially, the annual receipts of a private person, or a
corporation, from property." (Italics ours.)4 0
The distinction made by the lexicographers has received recog-
nition by the -courts.41
It would seem that if the ordinary significance is accorded the
terms used, winch, as tax appellatives, merely indicate the differ-
ent bases by winch the taxes are measured, there is as clear a dis-
tinction between an income tax and a property tax as there is
between an inheritance tax and a property tax. The same sug-
gestion-that it is a property tax-was advanced with respect to
inheritance taxes, just as it is now advanced with respect to
income taxes. The issue was met and disposed of contrary to the
contention made by recognizing that the tax is upon the individual,
based upon the exercise of a right and merely measured by the
property received. 42
Both present ownership of assets and past receipt of revenues are
legitimate measures of the taxpayer's ability to contribute to the
state for the purpose of maintaining those safeguards and advant-
ages winch the modern state offers to its citizens. From tins it
seems to follow that an income tax is not a property tax within
the meaning of constitutional provisions limiting or restricting the
imposition of taxes measured by property and it is submitted that
tins -new is best supported both by reason and authority
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